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()rammarians have c¡bserved for s<¡me time now that the now-forms <¡f verbs of cerebral
activities or states, verbs of cerebration, are different from the zoz¿-fbrms of most other
verbs in the English language. For instance ,the nou-form of the verb,thinh, requires the
progressive tense marker as in the sentence, I am thinhing about my supper nght now.The
,¿or¿,-fi)rm of'the verb hnow, requires the simple present tense marker as in the sentence,
Right nou,, I hnow what he is doing. (Not xI am knowing what he is doing.)
When he cliscusses this phenomenon, Zandvoort (1966:40) lists these verbs with
other verbs that show no diff'erence in the meaning of' the progressive and
non-progressive. He singles out hnow and hear for special comment, stating that the
progressive is used to express'development by degrees.' But when he writes about these
verbs, he f ails to include the other verbs of cerebration in his discussion.
In the same manner,Jespersen ( 196 l: lV ,223, sec. 14.6(8)) states that ". ..hnow, hear,
ancl belict,e cannot easily be used in the expanded forms (progressive tenses) when they
clenote one single act of perception." He, like Zandvoort, does not include a discussi<¡n
of'the l'r'lrraining verbs of'cerebration nor does he see the interaction <¡f'tense with the
difl'eringsurfácefirrms.Long(196 l:124)seesthe"...common-aspectforms(thesimple
tenses) ...or<linarily used when verbs express what best can be th«rught <¡f'as reflexes
-more 
<¡r less ¿rut<lnratic responses, whether sensory, emoti<¡nal «¡r intellectual." But he
also does n()t fi)cus <ln the verbs of cerebration to see the interplay of'tense and fbrm. He
simply lists velbs rvhich are subject to his rule: I hear )ou I She .sces rou I I don't belieu that I I
rcmemberthatfoccllforgetwuraddressllthinksolThat.r¿ri/,ur¡¿.etc. lnaddition,Quirket
al. (1972: 85 sec. 3.25) refer to the use of s¿r in the present under the heading of
"...Universal time statements, particularly associated with stative verbs..."
The patterning of the verbs of cerebrati<¡n with the differing tenses in English
appears to be easily explicable at first glance, but on examination, it turns out to be
fairly complex. As a result, to predict the use of the imperative, the difTerent
tenses and nominalized forms of the verbs of cerebration in English, a grammar which
includes the notion of optionality as a formal construct representing the choice of a
native speaker would appear to be necessary. Such a grammar could contain some of
the apparatus of the extended standard theory for the generation of strings since
Chomsky himself believes that at some point meaning must be linked to fbrm. A fairly
recent statement to this effect is found in Chomsky (1982:20): "The theory of
transformational generative grammar (one variety of generative grammar) offers one
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answer to these questions, an answer that I think is correct in essence though
insufficiently general. The answer is that D-structure, determining GF-theta, is
mapped onto S-structure by a certain class of rules, grammatical transformation..."
(1982:31). In his view, transformations map meaning into form by relating D-structure
to S-structure. For some languages such asJapanese, however, transformations are not
very important since rules such as move-alpha cannot be used to the same extent that
they are used in other languages such as English by Chomsky's own admission. The
fault, at this point, is not with the Japanese language but with transformational
grammar-a point that Gleason (1965: 209-2 l4) made some years ago. For this reason,
the model of linguistic analysis suggested here is different in certain respects from the
Chomskyan model although it has the same objective; namely, the mapping of meaning
into form. The crucial difference between such a grammar and the standard model
proposed by Chomsky would come in the area of a reassessment of the use of
transformations and also in the rejection of the autonomous syntax position held by
Chomsky and the subsequent adoption of the generation of strings from semantic
features as developed by Weinreich ( 1972). In this model there is a semantic calculator
which scans strings of feature matrices, computes their value to see if they are
compatible and then adjusts the matrices through the use of assigned or transfer
features in cases where the features are used to develop surface forms which are
different from underlying forms or which require readings that are not listed
separately in the lexicon. Weinreich himself stated that these features are similar to the
selectional features (restrictions) of Chomsky's Aspects-model. The difference between
the Chomskyan features and the Weinreich features is that the latter can be assigned
late in the generation of strings at or near the surface structure. Thus, for this study,
inherent features are those speciFred as inhering in the lexical items in the lexicon;
transfer features are those which are assigned by rule in the semantic calculator.
Thus, the model of linguistic description for this study assumes the following:
l. A base component, a sentence generating device, which produces strings o[ formatives
and which contains a transformational component that rearranges these formatives
according to given rules.
2. A lexicon in which lexical units are listed with their feature matrices in such a way that
unambiguous readings of each item can be fully specified.
3. Lexical insertion is accomplished after all the rules of the base component and the
transformational component have been applied.
4. It assigns semantic values to linguistic forms according to their occurrence in given
syntactic environments or according to their compatibility with other syntactic or semantic
features in the strings and deletes or otherwise changes them according to predetermined
rules for its operation. For this function o[the calculator, Weinreich offers an example in the
question Does this llower probably bl.oom in tlu winter? which would be derived from an
underlying stringThistlower probabll blooms in the winter (1972:80). The semantic calculator
would determine that probably is incompatible with the feature [+QUESTION] and thus
delete it ( 1972:79-80).
5. It adjusts the readings of some feature matrices in some environments so that meanings
not specified in the lexicon will be possible in these environments. Thus, for instance, tate
might have an inherent feature on the order of 'acquire willfully' in the lexicon but would
need to be adjusted by the semantic calculator to accommoda¡e tahz medicine,'imbit¡e,' tah¿
charge, 'command'and so on. (The example is from Weinreich, 1980:72).
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Besides providing a means in which optional choices can be included in a grammar
through the rules in the semantic calculator, such a model provides a manner in which
the meaning-bearing units of language arrived at through the study of semantics can be
directly related to the syntax of the language being studied. In Weinreich's terms, the
"... approach outlined here makes no attempts to fence off mutually exclusive domains
for syntax and semantics" (1972: I l3). In a similar vein, McCawley (1979:5) points out
that "... generative semanticists such as George Lakoff and myself rejected the notion of
the grammaticality of a sentence in isolation, adopting the position that a sentence can
be spoken of as grammatical only relative to meaning and a context...", thus reinforcing
the position adopted here. The model developed here differs from that of the
generative semanticists, however, since that model attempts to map the underlying
semantic forms through lexical decomposition. (See, for instance, G. Lakoff (1971).)
This model attempts to postulate underlying lexical-semantic forms and to plot the
distribution of surface manifestations of these underlying forms and thus to account
for various syntactic co-occurrence restrictions through the use of wide ranging rules or
generalizations. It differs from other attempts at finding semantic primes such as that
of Wierzbicka (1980) in that only those semantic features which correlate with
differences in syntactic distribution of surface forms are treated. It also makes no
attempt at finding names for these features which are, in some sense of the word,
'ultimately appropriate'; the names of these features are admittedly arbitraryjust as the
name erg or watt in the description of energy are also arbitrary. Wierzbicka
(1980:99-100) complains about this arbitrariness, stating that "To account for the
differences between the items in the set one would postulate some more such
'features'; the obvious candidates are '*/-visual', '*/-auditory', '*/-olfactory',
'+/-gustatory','*l-tactual')." She then complains about the use of such arbitrary
features since they are meaningless. But she has to admit that within a particular
formalism they become meaningful (1980:17). The use of features as "... the
appropriate representation of lexical items..." in this study is then similar to that of
Starosta (1982:379) who "... rejects the decomposition of words into semantic
predicates and adopts binary features..." At this point, then, and for this study, the
attempt will be made to show how features which are essentially semantic in nature
affect the distribution of grammatical elements.
In the study, a distinction will be made between illocutionary environments and
perlocutionary environments for the study of the distribution of the verbs of
cerebration in English. The terms, 'illocutionary'and'perlocutionary,' are borrowed
from Austin (1962) and are used with somewhat the same force as he intended. The
illocutionary environments are those in which sentences are used in "... the act of doing
something in saying something, the performance of the function, or force, or use of a
sentence..." The perlocutionary environments are those in which sentences are used as
"... the consequences or effects of the speaker's act upon the speaker or hearer..."
(Campbell 1974:222). Bierwisch expresses the same concept when he states: "... the
illocutionary and the perlocutionary act correspond to the communicative sense of a
speech act and its eventual consequences, respectively" (1980:3). Davis (1980:47) also
states: "... eliciting an answer is a perlocutionary act." A perlocutionary environment,
then, is an environment in which a perlocutionary act occurs; an illocutionary
environment is one in which an illocutionary act occurs. In other words, the
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perlocutionary environments are those in which the speaker is making a response to
verbal or nonverbal communication. The illocutionary environments are those in
which the speech act occurs without any necessary stimulation from another speaker.
This distinction has been established to accommodate what Fillmore and McCawley,
and undoubtedly other linguists, have noticed. Fillmore states:
Unhappily, the recurrent embarrassment of the generative grammarian is that his students
and his critics are forever contriving situations in which the sentences he had needed to
believe were ungrammatical turned out to be completely appropriate (1973:273).
McCawley makes a similar statement:
The alleged ability of speakers of a language to distinguish between 'grammatical' and
'ungrammatical' strings of words is about as rare and as perverse as the ability to construct
puns ... Anyone who has taught an introductory syntax course has had the experience of
presenting an 'ungrammatical' example only to be told by some smart-aleck about an
unsuspected interpretation on which the sentence is quite normal ... the strings o[ words on
which grammaticalityjudgements are allegedly made exist only as typographical or acoustic
objects, not as perceptual or cognitive objects as contrasted with its two interpretations,
which do exist as perceptual objects (1982:78-9).
It would appear that one of the factors that make both the McCawley and the Fillmore
statement true can be found in the distinction between perlocutionary or response
environments for utterances and all other environments here designated as
illocutionary environments.
The manner in which these environments affect the grammaticality of utterances is
as follows: In an illocutionary environment, I did is not a grammatical utterance. But in
a perlocutionary environment, it is:
Illocutionary environment: Who put these potatoes in the beef stew?
Perlocutionary environment: I did.
These environments affect the grammaticality in perhaps more subtle ways. For
instance, the now-form for most verbs of cerebration is the simple present in
illocutionary environment: / beliete that he can walh on water. But in perlocutionary
environments the now-florm can be the present progressive.
Illocutionary environment: What on earth are you doing now that you see him
walking on water?
Perlocutionary environment: I'm believing that he can walk on water.
No further attempt will be made at this point to show how these environments affect the
grammaticality of sentences. It is hoped that their use will become clear as the study
unfolds, but it might be pointed out that Eikmeyer and Rieser (1981:14l) find the
specification of contexts necessary in their development of a semantic theory in a
fashion similar to that indicated here.
The verbs of cerebration have different surface manifestations for stative and
non-stative underlying fbrms. For example , thinh is non-stative since it gives reference
to an activity. Know is stative since it describes a state of having knowledge. Thus, x¡',
hnowing that the pelican ts dying is ungrammatical but I'm thinhing about the pelican is
grammatical. The distinction between stative and non-stative verbs is one which many
grammarians find important for the description of the distribution of verb forms in
many languages. This distinction separates the underlying stative verbs such as lihe,
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which describe a state that an individual is in, and the underlying non-stative verbs such
as walh, which is undertaken by an agent. Non-stative verbs freely co-occur with the
imperative and the progressive tenses; the stative verbs do not. This is also true for the
verbs of cerebration. The non-stative forms freely co-occur with the progressive tenses;
the stative forms do not as in the sentences at (3), (5) and (6).
Under normal conditions, in illocutionary environments, the underlying verbs of
cerebration require the simple present as the nozr-form. Besides this, they do not occur
with the progressive or the imperative. Thus, all of the ¿-sentences at ( l) through (8) are
grammatical and none of the á or c-sentences are grammatical.
I believe that he is going to town tomorrow.
+ I am believing that he is going to town tomorrow.
* Believe that he is going to town tomorrow.
I doubt that he will ever do that again.
* I am doubting that he will ever do that again.
* Doubt that he will ever do that again.
I think that he is going to town tomorrow.
* I am thinking that he is going to town tomorrow.
* Think that he is going to town tomorrow.
I trust that he will come back to me some day.
* I am trusting that he will come back to me some day.
* Trust that he will come back to you some day.
Jack knows that entropy will finally overcome.
* Jack is knowing that entropy will finally overcome.
* Know that entropy will finallv overc()me.
Jack is ignorant of the fact that entropy will ñnally overcome.
* Jack is being ignorant of the fact that entropy will finally overcome.
* Be ignorant of the fact that entropy will finally overcome. Cf. Be ignorant o[ the
fact that entropy will finally overcome; see if I care.
.f eanice is abs<¡rbed in thought about her s()n's return.
* 
.f eanice is being absorbed in thought ab<lut her son's return.
* Be absorbed in thought about your s()n's return.
I presume that the world will come to an end soon.
* I am presuming that the world will c()me to an end soon.
x Presume that the world will come to an end soon.
I am «¡f'the opinion that the world will come to an end soon.
* I am being of the opinion that the world will c()me to an end sot¡n.
* Be «rf the opinion that the world will come t() an end soon.
I have a mind to stop all this silly n()nsense.
* I am having a mind to stop all this silly nonsense.
* Have a nrind to stop all this silly nonsense.
All «rf'the verbs in the ¿-sentences of (l) through (8) are stative and thus require the
simple present tense as the zoz¿-form.
All of'the underlying verbs of cerebration in this study have surface manifestati<¡ns
that can be used with the progressive tense as ¡.he now-form in illocutionary
envir«¡nments as in sentences (9) through (14) where the a-sentences are for the most
part ungrammatical while the á-sentences are grammatical. This is quite different from
the situati«rn in sentences (l) through (8).
l. a.
b.
c.
2. a.
b.
c.
2'. ¿.
b.
C.
3. a.
b.
C.
4. v.
b.
c.
5. ¿.
b.
C.
6. a.
l¡.
(.
7. a.
b.
c.
7',. 
.t.
b.
c.
1l}. ¿.
b.
c.
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9.a.* Right now, I think about going home.
Cf. Every night, I think about going home.
Right now, I'm thinking about going home.
Cf. Right now, I'm drinking my coffee.
Right now, I reflect on the nature of human existence.
Right now, I'm reflecting on the nature <¡f human existence.
Cf. I'm trying as hard as I can.
Right now, I intend to make a million dollars from ten dollars of Clorox stock.
Right now, I'm intending to make a million dollars from ten dollars in
Clorox stock.
Cf. Right now, I'm trying as hard as I can.
Right now, I assume that the world is coming to an end.
Cf. I assume that the world is coming to an end every night.
Right now, I'm assuming that the world is coming to an end right now.
Cf. Right now, I'm drinking my coffee.
Right now, I take notice of the fact that the world is coming to an end.
Cf. I take notice of his movements every night.
Right now, I'm taking notice of the fact that the world is coming tt¡ an end.
Cf. I'm looking into my coffee cup.
Right now, I learn that life is not all that easy.
Right now, I'm learning that life is not all that easy.
Cf. I'm trying as hard as I can.
b.
' [t would appear that the reason for the grammatical markings for the sentences at
(9) and (10)can be found in the distinction between cyclic and non-cyclic verbs. From
this, the surface forms thinh (that) and thinh about are not only differentiated on the
stative 
-non-stative dimension. The verbs in these sentences are also differentiated bythe cyclic and non-cyclic distinction. This distinction between cyclic and non-cyclic
verbs is one which Bull (1960;44-47) found important fbr the description of the
distribution of the preterite and imperfect forms in Spanish and similar fr¡rms in other
languages. Cyclicity and non-cyclicity separate the action underlying cyclic verbs such
as close, which describe an action that must be terminated before it can be repeated and
the action underlying non-cyclic verbs such as walh, which can be maintained
indefinitely without any necessary termination (Bull 1960:16-19). 'fhus, thinh is
non-cyclic since it gives reference to an activity that can be continued indeñnitely. Thinh
about is cyclic since the activity must be terminated and then repeated for indefinite
continuation. Thus, *I'm thinhing that there is a pelican in the distance is ungrammatical but
I'm thinking about a pelican in the distance is grammatical. The distinction in the difference
between thinh and thinh about has been in the language since the Old English period.
Jespersen (1961:rv, 222, sec. 14.6(6)) points out that there are actually two underlying
forms for thinh in Old English one from OE, pencean and one from OE byncean. The
latter freely occurs in sentences with the progressive, the f<¡rmer does not as in the
following sentences: I thinh it's going to rain and I was jwt thinking of you.
On the other hand, the primary form of at least one of the verbs of cerebration in
sentences (l) through (8) can be used in illocutionary environments with the
progressive if it expresses the underlying meaning of ability as in the sentence at ( I 5).
(15) I'm not thinking very well nowadays.
Other primary forms of the verbs of cerebration do not occur with the ability reading as
10. a. *
b.
I l. a. 7
b.
12. a.
b.
13. a. *
b.
14. a. *
b.
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in sentence (15). Besides this, stative verbs of cerebration which do not occur with the
progressive under normal circumstances (in illocutionary environments) can occur
with the progressive in perlocutionary environments as in sentences (16) through (2 l).
16. a. Sl
b. s2
17. a. Sl
b. s2
c.sl
d. sz
b.sz
19. a. Sl
b. s2
20. a. Sl
b. s2
21. a. Sl
You're not doing anything ab<¡ut it. Y<¡u don't believe that He will heal y<lu.
I am so. I am believing that He will heal me.
You are not thinking very clearly.
Oh, I don't know about that. I am doubting his original proposition.
You are not thinking very clearly.
Oh, I don't know about that. I am thinking that his original proposition might be
correct.
You didn't trust the statement that I made to you last week and you aren't
trusting it now.
I didn't trust it last week, but I am trusting it now.
What were you doing when the district attorney was cross-examining you?
I was playing dumb, looking stupid and not knowing anything.
When that question comes up again, be dumb and play ignorant.
I am being ignorant when any question comes up.
To really act as though you are absorbed in thought, you must be absorbed in
thought.
I am being absorbed in thought all the time.
Yesterday, I presumed that the world would come to an end so()n. But today, I'm
not too sure.
I am presuming that the world will come to an end all the time.
Anyone being of the opinion all the time that anybody can do anything at any
time indicates that this individual is crazy.
I am being of that opinion all the time.
Anyone having a mind to watch televisir¡n all the time is datf y.
I am having a mind to watch television all the time.
I don't believe that he can heal me of anything.
Please believe that he can heal you of your terminal cancer.
I doubt that he will ever be able to heal me.
Doubt that he will ever be able to heal you and he will be unable to dojust that.
I don't think that he will ever be able to heal me.
Think that he will be able to heal you and he will be able to do just that.
I cannot trust him to heal me.
Trust that he will be able to heal you and he will be able to do just that.
Jack knows that the end is in sight.
*Know that the end is in sight and it will soon appear around the corner. Cf.
Know thyself.
I don't care if I never learn all of the facts about esoteric approaches to language.
All right, be ignorant of the facts about esoteric approaches to language, see if I
18. a. Sl
Just as stative verbs of cerebration which do not occur with the progressive under
normal circumstances (in illocutionary environments) can occur with the progressive in
other circumstances (perlocutionary environments) so also these same verbs, which do
not occur with the imperative in illocutionary environments, can occur with the
imperative in perlocutionary environments as in the sentences from (24) through (3 l).
b. s2
22. a 51
b.s2:
c. sl:
d. 52:
23. a.5¡;
b. s2:
24. a. Sl:
b. 52:
25. a. Sl:
b. s2:
c. sl:
d. s2:
26. a. Sl:
b.s2'
27. a. Sl:
b.s2:
28. a. Sl
b. s2
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Why aren't you listening to me? Are you sick or are you lost in thought?
(Blank stare.)
All right, be absorbed in thought, see if I care.
I presume we will inherit a cool million in the very near future.
All right, presume that we will inherit a million in the near future but I hope that
our presumption does not soar too high.
I am of the opinion that the world will come to an end soon.
All right, be of the opinion that the world will come to an end soon, see if I care.
I hav? a mind to stop Billy from playing the part of a clown at the party
tonight.
All right. Have a mind to st<lp Billy from playing the part of a clown but please
don't be too serious about it. He'll create a scene.
29. a. Sl
b. s2
c. Sl
30. a. Sl
b. s2
c'sl
d. s2
31. a. Sl
b. s2
From the above sentences (24-31), it should be apparent that all of the verbs of
cerebration in this study (with the exception of know) can occur with the imperative in
perlocutionary environments. (Although ,tno¡u occurs with the imperative in the
sentence Know thlself as a stock phrase or idiom, it does not seem to occur with the
imperative if it is followed by a that-clause.)
So then, it can be that all of the verbs of cerebration have a common underlying
semantic form since they all manifest an idiosyncratic patterning as stative verbs
including exclusion from the imperative and progressive constructions. Similar surface
forms, however, may have different co-ocurrence restrictions depending on either
their assignment to different underlying forms <.¡r to the assignment of transfer
features to them in the surface. Thus, thinh as a verb of cerebration is basically a stative
verb marked [+STATIVE] as in the sentences at (2 d-f) when it is in construction with
that.When think occurs alone or in construction with about as in sentences (9) and ( l5), it
is basically an activity verb marked [-STATIVE] similar to rellect, intend, assume and
learn.Thus, there are two different underlying verbs of cerebration which have surface
manifestations resulting in the use of the lexical token thinh: one is marked
[+STATIVE] and the other is marked [-STATIVE]. It is als<¡ of interest, h<¡wever,
that the former, thinh that, can occur in constructions where stative verbs do not usually
occur with the progressive or the imperative as in the sentences at ( l7 c-d) and (25 c-d)
in perlocutionary environments. To account for this, a transfer feature [-STATIVE] is
assigned to thinh for its occurrence in these environments. The verb thinh then becomes
archetypal for all other verbs ofcerebration, then, patterning like verbs such as beLieue,
doubt, trust, hnow, be ignorant, be absorbed in thought, presume, be of the opinion and. haue a
mind to, on the one hand, and like verbs such as reJlect, intend, assume and learn, on the
other.
From this point it is possible to separate the verbs of cerebration into semantically
based sub-classes. One of these classes could be marked [+COGITATION]
I+STATIVE] and could include verbs such as thinh (that) and be absorbed in thought.
Another sub-class could be marked [+COGITATION] [-STATIVE] and would
include such verbs as thinh and thinh (about). A more complete specification of the verbs
of cerebration might be as follows:
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+CREDIBILITY
+INCREDIBILITY
+CONFIDENCE
+COGNITTON
+INCOGNITTON
+COGITATION
+POSTULATION
+ INTENTION
+ EDUCATION
+STATIVE
believe (that) have faith in
doubt (that) don't believe
trust (that) believe trust
know (that) know
be ignorant of be unaware
be absorbed think (that)
in thought
presume be.of the
oplnlon
ll3
-STATIVE
take notice of
think (about)
reflect, think
assume
intend
learn
Although it is p«rssible to find other verbs of cerebration and to arrange them into
difl'erent groups than the one suggested here, it would seem that this grouping nicely
demonstrates the interaction of stativity / non-stativity with the differing surface forms
ofthe verbs of'cerebration. Thus, verbs which are marked [+STATIVE] in the lexicon
rvith an inherent f'eature receive a transfer feature marking them [-STATIVE] in
perlocutionary environments. It is in this manner that the occurrence of many verbs of
cerebration, which normally behave as stative verbs but which can occur with the
progressive and the imperative as activity verbs in some environments, can be specified.
In conclusion, then, the assumption of common underlying fbrms for some of the
verbs <¡f' cerebration and the use of' Weinreich's transfer f'eatures to predict the
derivation <¡f'the diversity of'surface forms from these underlying forms prove useful
in a description <¡f'the nature «rf these verbs. Such an assumption als<¡ suggests practical
applicati«rns; fbr, if in fact underlying semantic considerations are directly related to
the graurrnatical distribution of surfáce fbrms, then a strategy for teaching the
gran)nratical distribution of'these forms is implied. Such a strategy is reminiscent of the
series nrethod put fbrth by the early twentieth century methodologist, Gouin, and
recentlv arlr'«¡cated by Diller (1971). In particular, insofár as the relation of'semantic
f'eatures to s!'ntactic f<¡rms is concerned, it would appear that those underlying fbrms
which are related semantically sh«¡uld be taught at the sanre time as in the series method
so that the si¡nilarities and differences in meaning can be described to the students in
such a way that the difTerences in grammatical firrm can be derived by the students
from these dif'f'erences in meaning, for, as Oller and Ziahosseiny (1970) have pointed
out, it is the very subtle difl'erences that cause the greatest difliculties. Besides this, it is
apparent that the distincti<¡n between perlocutionary environments and ill<-rcutionary
environments creates situations in which grammaticality judgements vary. It would
thus be incumbent on language teachers, materials developers and textbook writers to
produce lessons with both kinds of environments so that students can be exposed to the
full range of language use and grammaticality judgements arising fiom this use.
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